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The Redundant Free Exercise Clause?
Mark Tushnet*
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose the Free Exercise Clause were simply ripped out of the
Constitution. What would change in contemporary constitutional law?
Justice Kennedy has written, "[t]he Free Exercise Clause embraces a
freedom of conscience and worship that has close parallels in the speech
provisions of the First Amendment .... 2 The parallels may be so
close that the lines actually coincide. The reasons for the near-identity
of the protection afforded by the Free Exercise Clause and that afforded
by other constitutional provisions are founded in two doctrinal
developments. 3 First, although the Free Exercise Clause could be, and
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
I would like to thank Kevin Quinn, S.J., for his assistance in locating material on Roman Catholic
moral teaching, Andrew Koppleman, Eugene Volokh, and participants at a Faculty Research
Workshop at Georgetown University Law Center for helpful comments. I regret that personal
considerations made it impossible for me to attend, and therefore to profit from the discussions at,
the Loyola University Chicago School of Law Conference on Law and Religion for which this
Article was prepared.
1. I put the question this way so that I can concede the importance of the Free Exercise Clause
in the history of free expression law. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515
U.S. 753 (1995). "[I]n Anglo-American history .... government suppression of speech has so
commonly been directed precisely at religious speech that a free-speech clause without religion
would be Hamlet without the prince." Id. at 760. I am interested not in what the Free Exercise
Clause has contributed to the development of civil liberty, but what the contemporary Free
Exercise Clause adds to our civil liberties.
2. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 591 (1992).
3. A note on the nature of my enterprise seems appropriate. In what follows, I offer what I
believe to be the most natural readings of the relevant cases. I acknowledge that there are other
plausible readings, some of which would provide distinctive protection to religious liberty
through the Free Exercise Clause. See, e.g., infra note 82 and accompanying text (describing a
more aggressive reading of the protection afforded by the Free Exercise Clause when state laws
are not "generally applicable"); see also Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out
Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 3 (2000) (noting that exceptions articulated in Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), "if generously
interpreted, could prove to be a substantial exception" to the case's central holding). My sense is
that those who offer these alternative case readings do so because they disagree with the cases'
natural reading and believe that the Free Exercise Clause ought to give religious liberty more
protection than the Supreme Court appears to believe it should.
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has been, interpreted differently in the past, today the Clause protects
only against statutes that target religious practice for regulation. Under
the notorious peyote case, Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources v. Smith,4 the Clause does not require states to accommodate
their neutral statutes of general applicability to religious practices.5 The
present scope of the Free Exercise Clause, that is, is quite small.6
Second, other constitutional doctrines protect a wide range of actions
in which religious believers engage. Much religious activity is speech,
pure and simple, and therefore protected by the Free Speech Clause.
The free speech doctrine includes a non-discrimination requirement,
which the Supreme Court has invoked with respect to religious speech.7
Many regulations singling out religious speech for adverse treatment
fall under the non-discrimination requirement. Further, much religious
activity, while not conducted in words, may fairly be described as
symbolic speech, triggering free speech protection. In addition, some
aspects of religious practice not covered by free speech principles might
be protected by a constitutional right of intimate association. Finally, a
newly emerging doctrine defining a right of expressive association
could provide substantial protection for the internal activities of
religious organizations, where those activities are in some sense
constitutive of the religious community itself.8 Thus, the protection
afforded the exercise of religion by clauses other than the Free Exercise
Clause is relatively large.9
4. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
5. See infra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing the neutrality and generality
requirements of enforceable laws).
6. Of course my argument would fail if the Clause's scope expanded, for example by a
judicial repudiation of the peyote case.
7. Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (holding that
a university regulation prohibiting the use of funds for student religious organizations was a form
of viewpoint discrimination, violating the First Amendment).
8. See infra Part III (arguing that the Free Speech Clause in combination with the Free
Exercise Clause would protect religious practice left unprotected after the peyote case).
9. Steven Gey has recently argued that governments may invoke the Establishment Clause to
justify restrictions on religious expression that would not be allowed were the government
invoking its general police powers to restrict non-religious expression. Steven G. Gey, When Is
Religious Speech Not "Free Speech"?, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 379, 400 (2000). I do not address
Gey's argument in this Article because my concern is with what might be called the coverage of
religious expression-whether it would have special constitutional weight absent the Free
Exercise Clause-and not with the question of the circumstances in which limitations on such
expression might be justified. In my terms, the title of Professor Gey's article is a bit misleading
because the article does not address the2 question of "When is religious speech not 'free speech'?,"
but rather the question, "When is religious speech permissibly subject to regulation in
circumstances where secular speech would not be subject to regulation?."
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Together these observations suggest my conclusion: Contemporary
constitutional doctrine may render the Free Exercise Clause
redundant. 10
II. RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION AS SPEECH
According to the Supreme Court, "private religious speech.., is as
fully protected under the Free Speech Clause as secular private
expression."'1  We must, of course, have in hand an analysis of free
speech law before we can analyze the extent to which religious
activities are "fully protected under the Free Speech Clause." Today
there are two available structures for free speech analysis. 12 These two
structures sometimes yield different results, and make sense of sets of
Supreme Court decisions that differ slightly. As I will argue, they do
10. According to some approaches to constitutional interpretation, that conclusion is a reason
to reject contemporary constitutional doctrine. Such approaches insist that every constitutional
provision have some independent meaning. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 588
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). In Lopez, Justice Thomas argues against the view that Congress
has the power to regulate activities that affect interstate commerce because if it did,
many of Congress' other enumerated powers under Art. I, § 8, [would be] wholly
superfluous. After all, if Congress may regulate all matters that substantially affect
commerce, there is no need for the Constitution to specify that Congress may enact
bankruptcy laws, cl. 4, or coin money and fix the standard of weights and measures, cl.
5, or punish counterfeiters of United States coin and securities, cl. 6. Likewise,
Congress would not need the separate authority to establish post offices and post roads,
cl. 7, or to grant patents and copyrights, cl. 8, or to "punish Piracies and Felonies
committed on the high Seas," cl. 10.
Id.
Frederick Mark Gedicks defends a position similar to the one developed here. Frederick Mark
Gedicks, Towards a Defensible Free Exercise Doctrine, GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming
2001). Professor Gedicks argues that free speech and related doctrines should be developed in
ways that acknowledge the presence of a religious interest. This, Professor Gedicks argues,
would avoid making the Free Exercise Clause redundant. I am not sure that it would. Professor
Gedicks argues, for example, that religious expression should be treated as a form of high-value
speech, but I doubt that doing so requires that we treat the fact that speech is religious as
something that changes the application of standards for determining when speech is high-value.
For a discussion of the question of whether religious speech is high-value speech, see infra notes
32-35 and accompanying text.
11. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995).
12. In this Article, I do not address the distinctive problem of government speech. In my
view, questions about government speech present problems with respect to the government's
general police powers and with respect to the Establishment Clause. I do not think that, on
careful analysis, questions about the permissibility of speech by government officials in their
official capacity are fruitfully addressed in free exercise terms. See Gey, supra note 9, at 392
(concluding that non-policy making public employees "receive some free speech protection for
their purely private religious expression" but only up to the point that their expression is not
logically "attributable to the government").
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not differ substantially with respect to those religious activities that can
fairly be characterized as speech or symbolic speech. 13
A. Direct Regulation of Religious Activities as Free Speech
The easier model to describe divides all expressive activities into two
categories, one category receiving full protection and the other receiving
no protection. Byfull protection, I mean that state efforts to regulate the
activity must satisfy a high standard. 14 By no protection, I mean, as a
preliminary statement, that rational state efforts to regulate will be
permitted. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire15 provides a convenient
statement of this model:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting'
words .... 16
Expression "inside" the scope of the First Amendment is fully
protected; expression "outside" it is not. What about religious
expression?
Governments can regulate expression directly or indirectly. Direct
regulation consists of rules prohibiting the expression. Indirect
regulation raises the costs of expression in some other way, for
example, by denying the expression some benefit, like access to public
space available to other forms of expression. The peyote case used
these terms to describe direct regulation: A direct regulation "requires
(or forbids) the performance of an act that [a person's] religious belief
forbids (or requires)."' 17 Direct regulation is impermissible if the act in
question is belief or the profession of belief, for both are forms of
speech, pure and simple. Coerced speech cases such as Wooley v.
Maynard'8 make obvious this point.
13. I do not purport to deal comprehensively in this Article with all problems of religious
exercise. My defense is that I do cover a great deal of the relevant territory. The scope of a
distinctive free exercise protection would be small even if, as I doubt, such distinctive protection
were needed for every problem I fail to discuss.
14. Depending on the context, this standard might be described as strict scrutiny or as the clear
and present danger test or some variant adapted to the particular problem at hand. I do not
believe that anything significant turns on the standard's precise formulation.
15. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
16. Id. at 571-72 (citations omitted).
17. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990).
18. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-17 (1977) (holding that a state may not require an
individual to disseminate an ideology by requiring the individual to display the state motto on
private property).
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But, as the peyote case emphasized, religious exercises involve not
only words but "the performance of (or abstention from) physical
acts. . . . 9 Some of those acts, however, may fairly be characterized as
symbolic speech. As a general matter, an expressive activity is
symbolic speech when it is intended to communicate and when, as a
matter of social reality, it is generally understood by some relevant
audience as a communication. Many forms of ritual activity are
symbolic speech. So, for example, a class studying the Bible is engaged
in pure speech, while a congregation receiving communion is engaged
in symbolic speech.20  The act of communion is intended as a
communication by the congregants to each other and, more importantly,
to their God, 21 and non-congregants in our society generally understand
the act of communion as a communication of some sort.
Unfortunately, the general status of symbolic speech in the inside-
outside model is confused. I suspect that most commentators believe
that an expressive activity intended and understood as a communication
should be given full protection. If so, ritual activities fitting that
description would be fully protected.22 The Supreme Court's position is
somewhat more complex. An expressive activity characterized as
symbolic speech can be directly regulated if the state's justification for
the regulation is "unrelated to the suppression of free expression . ".."23
That is, direct regulation is permissible when the government has some
reason, independent of the act's expressive content, to regulate.
Commentators take issue with the Court's approach because it seems
unlikely that the government would enact or enforce a direct regulation
of an activity intended and understood as a communication unless it
were concerned with the communicative content of the activity.
19. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877.
20. The example is adapted from Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 286 (1981) (White, J.,
dissenting).
21. 1 acknowledge the awkwardness of the fit between this description and the congregation's
deepest understanding of what is occurring; to say that an act of communion is intended to
communicate to God is, in some ways, to demean the act. In addition, some sorts of religious
observance are not understood by the religion's adherents as communication at all. This is
particularly true of some Native American religions. For a discussion of some Native American
religious observances with no communicative function, see David C. Williams & Susan H.
Williams, Volitionalism and Religious Liberty, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 769 (1991). And, from a
different direction, perhaps the Constitution's identification of religion as a matter of special
concern, in the Free Exercise Clause, makes it easier for the law to appreciate that rituals directed
at a worshiper's god should be understood as speech protected by the Free Speech Clause.
22. See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (discussing some complications that arise
when a ritual activity is intended as a communication but not understood as such).
23. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
2001]
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The Court's development of the inside-outside model confirms this
insight. Suppose an expressive activity, whether a religious ritual or
otherwise, lies outside the scope of the Free Speech Clause. It is
somewhat misleading to say that the activity receives no protection at
all; the government's regulation must still be rational. But, the Court
has said, there is an additional requirement where the regulated activity
is expressive. The government may not discriminate against particular
viewpoints expressed in acts, including speech, that are outside the
coverage of the First Amendment in the inside-outside model.24
Similar results occur with respect to religious rituals to the extent
they can be described as symbolic speech. The Court in the peyote case
made this point while invoking what it described as the residual
protection afforded by the Free Exercise Clause: A state could not
prohibit particular physical acts "only when they are engaged in for
religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that they
display." 25 The Court applied this rule in finding unconstitutional a
city's ban on the ritual slaughter of animals performed as part of
Santerfa religious worship. 26  The Free Speech Clause's ban on
viewpoint discrimination produces the same result.27  Much religious
ritual would thus be protected as speech, whether pure or symbolic,
because governments are unlikely to enforce regulations against
religious activities intended and understood as communications for
reasons other than the activities' communicative content.
Some activities motivated by religious belief, including certain
religious rituals, may not be fairly described as symbolic speech. This
may be because the activities, while motivated by religious belief and
intended to communicate that belief (whether to God, to other
congregants, or to the wider community), are not generally understood
to be communications. Ordinarily this occurs when the activity's
communicative message is ambiguous to those not already cognizant of
the intended message. The peyote case may be an example: Those
outside the religious community may believe that the non-religious
benefits of the use of a psychoactive drug are large enough to induce
24. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (holding that although "fighting
words" are generally not protected under the First Amendment, a state may not impose content-
based prohibitions on some "fighting words").
25. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
26. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
27. Of course, a club that slaughtered animals simply for the pleasure of it would be unable to
invoke the Free Speech Clause. But an anti-vegetarian club that slaughtered animals to express
its members views could do so, and could invoke the ban on viewpoint discrimination were the
state to ban only the club's acts of animal slaughter.
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people to engage in the ritual activity because they want to obtain the
non-religious benefits.28  Similarly, religiously motivated provision of
sanctuary to refugees may be understood as a political rather than a
religious act, and religiously motivated objections to autopsies may
seem simply irrational.
Other religiously motivated actions are not even plausibly described
as symbolic speech. Here, the best examples are cases involving the
application of local zoning ordinances or historic preservation rules to
church structures. Perhaps a religion requires that a church be located
somewhere in a neighborhood. The claim that the congregation's
religious beliefs require that the church not provide parking spaces
commensurate with local zoning requirements is implausible. The
refusal to provide sufficient parking spaces is unlikely to be intended as
a communication, and it is certainly unlikely to be understood as a
communication.
Religiously motivated actions that cannot be described as symbolic
speech can be regulated if the government has a valid reason, unless the
reason arises from the religious content of the action. The same is true
if the religiously motivated action is fairly characterized as symbolic
speech and one accepts the Supreme Court's approach to the analysis of
symbolic speech. Enforceable laws that directly regulate religious
activities, whether speech activities or other religiously motivated
activities, are neutral laws of general applicability. Their neutrality
follows from the requirement that, even outside the Free Speech
Clause's coverage, governments may not discriminate on the basis of
viewpoint. Their generality follows from the requirement that the
government have some reason other than the suppression of free
expression to justify direct regulation of expressive activities.29  In
short, the Free Speech Clause provides at least as much protection to
28. Cf. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (rejecting the claim that a religious believer
can refuse to pay Social Security taxes for his employees). In Lee, Justice Stevens noted that
non-members of the religious community may believe that the financial benefits of the asserted
religious belief swamp the religious ones. Id. at 264 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring).
29. One can read the requirement of general applicability to provide somewhat greater
protection for religious liberty. Consider a statute that regulates some activity but contains some
exemptions, whether expressly or in its administration by granting decision-makers the discretion
to exempt particular individuals or groups from the regulation. The statute would not target
religious activity in a discriminatory way if the exemptions were provided only to non-religious
activities, but were denied to some non-religious activities as well as to religious ones. My view
is that this interpretation of the "general applicability" standard, while legally tenable, is one of
those aggressive readings motivated by discomfort with the basic rule laid down by the peyote
case.
2001]
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religious activities as the current incarnation of the Free Exercise Clause
does.
I can now introduce the second model of free expression law. While
the inside-outside model sharply distinguishes between activities that
fall within the protection of the Free Speech Clause and those that fall
outside it,30 the alternative model is more like an onion, with different
layers in which different types of speech receive differing degrees of
protection. This model emerged as the Court became uncomfortable
with what it considered the rigidities associated with full protection of
speech inside the scope of the First Amendment under the inside-
outside model. The Court initially treated all commercial speech as
outside the First Amendment's scope, 31 but later found that some
commercial speech deserved some degree of protection. 32  The Court
retained a lurking sense that not all commercial speech deserved the
same high degree of protection afforded political speech, and began
protecting commercial speech at a level between fully protected and
unprotected speech.33 A similar development occurred with respect to
sexually explicit but non-obscene speech. Some of its forms seemed to
the Court to be deserving of some protection, but certainly not the
protection given core political speech. 34  The Court thus moved toward
a model in which protection came in layers: High-value speech was
fully protected, intermediate-value speech (commercial speech)
somewhat less so, low-value speech (sexually explicit non-obscene
30. This creates large problems in the administration of free speech law, because the
characterization of a particular activity becomes crucial. A non-libelous statement is entitled to
full protection, a libelous one to none; a sexually explicit but non-obscene photograph is entitled
to full protection, an obscene one to none. A similar characterization problem can arise with
respect to religious activities, when the activity may be widely, but not universally, understood as
a communication. An example may be the wearing of religious head-gear. Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). The Court's solution to the problem in the free speech area
has been to insist on clear statutory definitions of the matter sought to be regulated, typically
through the use of the overbreadth doctrine. As far as I know, no similar development has
occurred in the free exercise area. Perhaps a reconceptualization of free exercise as free speech
might have the benefit of producing sustained attention to the problems of overbreadth associated
with religious activities. There is a glimpse of the problem in Justice Blackmun's dissent in the
peyote case, which noted that consumption of peyote is not as attractive as outsiders might think.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 914 n.7 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Free exercise law before the peyote case
incorporated a balancing test, which is inimical to robust development of overbreadth concepts.
Once the problems migrate to the free speech context, perhaps the overbreadth problems can be
directly confronted.
31. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54(1942).
32. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770
(1976).
33. See id.
34. See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
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speech) even less so, and really low-value speech almost entirely
unprotected.35 At each layer, state regulatory interests increase in
importance. Thus, an interest insufficient to justify regulation of high-
value speech may justify the regulation of intermediate-value speech.
This onion model creates what have been called subject-matter
classifications of speech, distinguished from content-based and
viewpoint-based classifications. 36 The degree of scrutiny a regulation
receives depends on the subject-matter regulated. The key question for
this Article then becomes: Which layer includes religious expression? I
believe the Court has not addressed this question largely because the
Free Exercise Clause provided an alternative source of protection before
the peyote case. My intuition, though, is that religious speech would be
given the protection afforded speech either in the highest-value category
or in the intermediate-value category.
Some of the reasons that political speech has high-value also apply to
religious speech as well. For example, governments have historically
targeted religious speech for suppression just as they have targeted
dissident political speech. Additionally, religious speech is, for many,
at least as central to their self-definition as political speech. Yet, some
of the reasons that political speech has high-value apply much less
strongly to religious speech. In particular, religious speech does not
serve as a direct check on the political power of rulers in the way that
political speech does. 37 The differences between political speech and
religious speech suggest that the Free Exercise Clause may provide a
reason independent of free speech theory for treating religious speech as
possessing high-value in the free speech doctrinal framework.
My intuition is that religious speech ought to receive at least as much
protection as commercial speech. The implications of that intuition lie
largely beyond this Article's scope. Clearly, the conclusions drawn in
the analysis of direct regulation under the inside-outside model would
remain valid were religious speech treated as high-value speech. The
analysis of intermediate-value speech differs only to the extent that state
35. This model may itself be undergoing some development, as the Court has increased the
protection given commercial speech, perhaps to the point where it receives full protection. See 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (holding that a state may not entirely ban
the advertisement of liquor prices consistent with the First Amendment).
36. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case
of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 81-83 (1978) (arguing that speech
restrictions based on "subject-matter" comprise a distinct classification of restrictions for the
purposes of First Amendment analysis).
37. Religious speech may contribute indirectly to checking government power by helping
constitute important civil society institutions.
2001]
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regulatory interests can more frequently outweigh the free speech
interest when intermediate-value speech is involved.38
B. Indirect Regulation of Religious Expression as Speech
Indirect regulation occurs when the government allows people to
engage in an activity their religion requires, but raises the cost of doing
so relative to the costs incurred by people engaged in similar, but non-
religious, activities. The core examples here are cases involving the
availability of public resources-whether money or space-to support
activities that some people are motivated to engage in for religious
reasons and that others are motivated to engage in for secular reasons.
Some people want to communicate their political views in a public park,
with an eye to persuading others to agree with them; others want to
communicate their religious views in the same place, with the same
goal. Some people want to provide food and shelter to the needy and
homeless based on secular accounts of justice; others want to do so
because of their religious beliefs. Some people want to provide
education outside the public schools because they believe that public
schools are ineffective; others want to do so because they believe that
public schools improperly exclude religion. The government indirectly
regulates religious activities when it makes the park available to the
political proselytizer, but not the religious one, when it provides funds
for the secular soup kitchen, but not the religious one, and when it
creates a voucher program in which vouchers can be used only at
private schools not affiliated with religious institutions. When does the
Free Speech Clause prohibit indirect regulation of religious expression
in these ways?
Indirect regulation of religious expression takes two forms. First, the
government may single out religious expression for exclusion from
access to the public resource at issue. Alternatively, religious
expression may fall within a larger category of activities that are denied
access to the resource. 39 According to the Supreme Court, singling out
religious expression for indirect regulation requires quite strong
justifications because it amounts to discrimination on the basis of
38. Those interests vary so greatly, and the balancing that occurs when such variations are
introduced can be so complex, that I find it unhelpful to attempt even to sketch the possible
outcomes were religious speech treated as intermediate-value speech.
39. In the latter situation, the regulation may simply have an adverse impact on specific
religious activities, or it may have a disparate impact on such activities when individuals with
religious motivations are more likely than others to engage in the activities falling within the
category.
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viewpoint.4° As in the case of direct regulation, much religious activity
can be described as expressive when indirect regulation is involved a.4
The conclusion that religious speakers cannot be excluded from
access to public resources devoted to speaking seems straightforward
enough. The reason supporting that conclusion is important. Typically
the government's asserted justifications for excluding religious speakers
range from a desire not to support religion even indirectly, to a concern
that the government might be violating the Establishment Clause by
making public resources available to religious speakers, or, more
loosely, to a concern that the government should not do something
conveying the appearance of support for religion or for specific
religions. That is, the justification for excluding religious speakers from
access to the public resource at issue typically relates to the religious
content of what the speakers have to say. However, as we have seen,
direct regulation of expressive activities is permitted only if the
government's reason for regulation is unrelated to the expressive
content of the regulated activities. The rule barring a categorical
exclusion of religious expression from access to public resources
parallels the rule against direct regulation of expressive activities.
Consider next the exclusion, not of religious expression, but of some
activities motivated by religious belief from access to public resources.
Some systems of public assistance to the needy make it impossible to
provide such services in religious settings, that is, in settings where the
service-providers make clear their religious commitments. 42  What are
the justifications for excluding such providers from the program? Some
of the justifications mirror those listed above; they are justifications
related to the religious content of what is available-the religious
symbols and statements that those who receive assistance cannot
avoid-and where the service is to be provided. To that extent, I
40. See Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835 (1995) (holding
that a university regulation prohibiting use of university funds to support student religious
organizations was a form of viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment).
41. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text (discussing when symbolic speech is an
expressive activity).
42. Obviously, exclusion would be constitutional if inclusion violated the Establishment
Clause. The Free Speech Clause cannot require what the Establishment Clause prohibits. The
scope of the Establishment Clause is, of course, an enormous topic in itself. All that needs to be
said here, I think, is that the presence of a free exercise interest in addition to, or instead of, a free
speech interest, cannot change the conclusion that one constitutional provision cannot require
what another prohibits. I qualify this point below. See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text
(arguing that some legislative accommodations to religion may be acceptable because of the Free
Exercise Clause but would, perhaps, be unacceptable under the Establishment Clause alone).
2001]
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
believe, the exclusion of religiously motivated providers from access to
the programs is questionable.
Another set of justifications is based on the free speech interests of
the recipients of the provided service. Recall that coerced expression,
religious or not, is banned by the Free Speech Clause.43 The general
concern with providing certain religious organizations engaged in
public assistance with access to public resources, is that recipients of the
assistance will be coerced into participating in religious exercises. The
coercion might be blatant, as when a service provider requires a
recipient to attend a religious ceremony as a condition of receiving the
service, or it might be subtle, as when religious symbolism suffuses the
location in a way that makes it seem natural for the recipient to move
from the soup kitchen to the sanctuary. Under current understandings
of the Free Speech Clause, exclusion of religious activities from access
to public resources for these reasons would probably be constitutional,
either because the justifications for exclusion should be described as
unrelated to suppression of expression or, more plausibly in my view,
because the free speech interests of recipients outweigh the free speech
interests of the service providers. 44
One might think that the Free Exercise Clause added something here
to the constitutional protection of religious expression and activity. I
have described the problem of potential coercion as one in which free
speech interests are pitted against other free speech interests. Where the
free speech interest on one side of the balance is an interest in religious
speech, a Free Exercise Clause independent of the Free Speech Clause
might add weight to that side. Unfortunately, as the coerced speech
cases show, there appears to be a free exercise interest on both sides of
the balance. The recipient's interest in avoiding coerced speech is also
an interest in religious speech, because the free exercise principle
protects the liberty of non-believers and believers equally.
The final problem to be addressed is indirect regulation in the form of
laws that have an adverse or disparate impact on religious activity.
Modern free speech law gives slight protection against such indirect
regulations. The exemplary case is Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence.45 In Clark, the Court upheld the application of a general
43. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing one such coerced speech case).
44. Alternatively, perhaps at least some systems in which the government puts private parties
in a position to coerce others, blatantly or subtly, into religious expression would violate the
Establishment Clause. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding that a
school district's policy allowing student-led prayer at football games violated the Establishment
Clause).
45. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
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rule against camping in national parks to prohibit advocates for the
homeless from erecting a "tent city." The tent city would have made the
point that national policy had deprived the tent city's residents of
affordable shelter.46 Applying the regulation to the tent city clearly
adversely affected the advocates' ability to express their point of view.
This case shows that mere adverse effect on expression does not
invalidate otherwise permissible regulations. Nor, as the peyote case
shows, does mere adverse effect on religious activity trump permissible
regulations. 4
7
Older cases, which the Court appears to regard as good law, suggest
that the Free Speech Clause prohibits some regulations that adversely
affect speech.48 In some of these cases, the Court appears concerned
that applying an apparently neutral regulation will have a disparate-not
merely an adverse-impact on some identifiable class. To use the
clearest example, prohibiting everyone from using a city's parks or
streets for demonstrations will have a more serious impact on the
relatively poor than on the relatively well-to-do. The latter can rent
space for a rally, or buy time on television to disseminate their message;
the former cannot. I find the contours of the disparate impact doctrine
quite unclear.49  To the extent such a doctrine exists, it should be
adaptable so that a free speech disparate impact doctrine would apply to
regulations that have a disparate impact on religious expression. 50
C. Conclusion
The Free Speech Clause, as currently interpreted, provides protection
for almost all of what the Free Exercise Clause, as currently interpreted,
does. There are some areas where the overlap is incomplete, where the
Free Exercise Clause provides distinctive protection even after the
46. Id. at 299.
47. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
48. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (holding that an ordinance
prohibiting individuals from knocking on doors to distribute literature violated the First
Amendment); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (striking down as violative of the First
Amendment an ordinance prohibiting distribution of literature on public streets).
49. Gedicks, supra note 10, (arguing that existing free speech doctrine provides rather robust
protection when speech is incidentally burdened by facially neutral regulations). I think that
Gedicks gives more weight to some of the Court's verbal formulations than is appropriate in light
of the way in which the Court has applied its tests. In my view, existing doctrine provides
relatively little protection when non-religious speech is incidentally burdened, and would provide
the same relatively low level of protection to religious expression.
50. I am not sure that there are any good examples of such regulations, or, if there are any,
whether they are at all significant. If they are rare or unimportant, my basic point would stand:
The Free Exercise Clause adds little of importance to what is available under the Free Speech
Clause.
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peyote case. Those areas are, however, rather small. Little would be
lost if the Free Exercise Clause, as currently interpreted, were dropped
from the Constitution. As I argue next, some of what might be lost
could be picked up again under the emerging doctrine protecting a right
of expressive association.
III. RELIGIOUS PRACTICES AND THE RIGHT OF EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION
A. Introduction: Defending the Ministerial Exemption
A state directive that a church employ someone in a ministerial
capacity who lacks what the church regards as an essential qualification
for the job would seem to be a quintessential violation of the Free
Exercise Clause. Yet, the possibility that the state could do so without
violating the Clause opened up after the peyote case.5 1 Many state laws
ban discrimination on the basis of gender and marital status. Some
denominations have religious tenets according to which only men, or
married people, can serve as ministers. As far as I am aware, no state's
anti-discrimination law has been interpreted to proscribe those
employment practices, with legislatures creating exemptions for
churches or courts construing the anti-discrimination statutes as not
reaching the practices in question. 52  The peyote case, however,
suggests that states could apply their anti-discrimination laws to the
employment practices of churches without violating the Free Exercise
Clause because such laws seem to be neutral laws of general
applicability. 53  However, the Free Exercise Clause is not the only
constitutional provision available to churches defending their
employment practices.
51. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 872.
52. In the federal context, Title VII exempts "a religious corporation, association, educational
institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to
perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational
institution, or society of its activities." Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (1994).
Also, "it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a school, college, or other educational
institution.., to hire and employ employees of a particular religion if... the curriculum of such
school, college, university, or other educational institution ... is directed toward the propagation
of a particular religion." Id. § 2000e-2(e)(2). Title VII also exempts hirings, dismissals, or
classifications based on religion where "religion ... is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the natural operation of that particular business or enterprise." Id. §
2000e-2(e)(1).
53. See Jack M. Battaglia, Religion, Sexual Orientation, and Self-Realization: First
Amendment Principles and Anti-Discrimination Laws, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 189, 376-77
(1999) (asserting that "[iut is questionable" whether the constitutional requirement of a ministerial
exemption survives the peyote case); see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 872.
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A series of cases culminating in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale54
recognizes a constitutionally protected right of expressive association.
55
Dale clarified the contours of that right. First, the right protects
associations that "engage in some form of expression, whether it be
public or private." 56  The Boy Scouts qualified under this standard
because the organization sought "to transmit ... a system of values."
57
Second, the courts must "defer[] to an association's assertions regarding
the nature of its expression." 58 That is, the values an association seeks
to transmit simply are what the association asserts them to be. Courts
should not examine the values, or the views expressed, to determine
whether they are "internally inconsistent" or otherwise problematic, as
long as they are sincerely held. 59  Third, the right of expressive
association is impaired if the government's requirement "affects in a
significant way the group's ability to advocate public or private
viewpoints. ' 6° Finally, just as the courts must defer to an association's
statements about its own views, they must also defer "to an
association's view of what would impair its expression."61 In particular,
some entities entitled to the protection of the right of expressive
association are protected against "[t]he forced inclusion of an unwanted
person" because such inclusion would "force the association to send a
message ... to the world" that is inconsistent with the organization's
own message. 6
2
The precise scope of the right of expressive association remains to be
determined. At a minimum, it provides a constitutional basis, other than
the Free Exercise Clause, for exempting church employees from the
coverage of state anti-discrimination laws. Churches plainly engage in
public and private expression, and seek to transmit a set of values. A
church that claims its message would be impaired by complying with
non-discrimination laws is claiming, for example, that the inclusion of
54. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
55. See New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988); Bd. of
Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
56. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648.
57. Id. at 650.
58. Id. at 653.
59. Id. at 651.
60. Id. at 648.
61. Id. at 653. Assertions to that effect appear to be insufficient standing alone; apparently the
courts must be satisfied that the association's claim of impairment is at least reasonable in some
minimal sense.
62. Id. at 648, 653.
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women in the ministry would send a message to the world inconsistent
with the church's own values.
The ministerial exemption is easy to sustain under the right of
expressive association. So are somewhat broader applications of
church-based employment exemptions. Michael McConnell suggests
that a limited reading of the right of expressive association might not
provide full protection to church-related employment decisions: "A
church or synagogue [should] not need to demonstrate that employment
of any particular person would be inconsistent with its expressive
purpose; the law respects the fundamental autonomy of religion with
respect to all employment in a religious capacity." 63  Dale's emphasis
on judicial deference to an institution's characterization of its expressive
activities means that churches would not have to demonstrate
inconsistency, but merely assert it, to obtain the protection McConnell
thinks desirable. More interesting and difficult cases arise from two
components of the Supreme Court's doctrine. One is the test for
determining whether an entity has a right of expressive association; the
other is the test for determining when such an entity is forced to send a
message incompatible with its own.
B. Identifying Entities Covered by the Right of Expressive Association
As the Court stated in Dale, to be covered by the right of expressive
association, the entity "must engage in some form of expression,
whether it be public or private." 64 Consider an ordinary commercial
enterprise owned by a group of devoutly religious friends, who place
expressions of their religious beliefs throughout their place of
business.65 One can readily imagine a charge that the pervasiveness of
those expressions constitutes harassment of employees on the basis of
religion,66 or that the displays discriminate against potential customers
63. McConnell, supra note 3, at 20.
64. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648 (emphasis added).
65. I use the example of a business owned by a group of people for expository purposes, to
avoid being distracted by questions that might arise were the business to be owned by a single
person, whose right of association might be thought not to be implicated in regulations limiting
the display of religious materials in the business-place. I believe that an individual owner does
have a right of expressive association, for reasons I discuss below, see infra notes 71-81 and
accompanying text, but think it better to discuss the coverage of commercial entities before I
discuss the coverage of intimate ones.
66. For examples, see Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does "Hostile Work Environment"
Harassment Law Restrict?, 85 GEO. L.J. 627, 630-33 (1997). Such examples of harassment
include an employer placing religious articles in the employee newsletter and Christian-themed
verses on the paychecks; another employer allowed daily broadcasting of prayers over the public
address system. Id.
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who adhere to other religions or to no religion at all. Would the owners
be protected by the right of expressive association against such charges?
It is tempting to think that the right of expressive association extends
only to entities organized for the purpose of expression, or perhaps
more broadly to entities that engage primarily in expression. That
would be sufficient to cover churches as institutions, 67 but would leave
religious believers acting through other types of organizations
unprotected. Dale shows, however, that entities entitled to claim the
protection of the right of expressive association need not devote
themselves entirely to expression or even to the transmission of values.
The Boy Scouts engage in many activities other than expression or the
transmission of values, including some commercial activities. As the
Court said, "associations do not have to associate for the 'purpose' of
disseminating a certain message" to be protected by the right of
expressive association. 68  Richard Epstein has pointed out that nearly
every commercial entity has a "corporate culture" that serves as the
entity's expression of its basic commitments. 69  As Epstein puts it,
"every organization engages in expressive activity when it projects itself
to its own members and to the rest of the world."'70 Under that analysis,
Dale might provide constitutional protection to all associations.
Extending the right of expressive association to ordinary commercial
enterprises owned and operated by people with deeply held beliefs,
religious or political, might be quite troubling. The owner of Ollie's
Barbeque may have had political or moral objections to serving
African-Americans in the restaurant he owned.7' Lester Maddox, who
became governor of Georgia, came to public attention when he
vehemently objected to "associating" with African-Americans by
67. David E. Bernstein, Antidiscrimination Laws and the First Amendment, 66 MO. L. REV.
83 (2001). The article concludes that Dale would protect religious schools that discharge
"employees who become pregnant out of wedlock if sex outside of marriage is frowned upon by
the sponsoring church," and that "[c]hurches that teach that mothers should stay at home with
young children may... refuse to employ women with young children." Id. at 130-31. I wonder
whether a religious school that predicates its action on concern for "sex outside of marriage"
could thereby justify discharging only unmarried pregnant women, and not men who engage in
non-marital sexual relations. Of course, the school could reformulate its religiously based
concern so as to deal only with "sex outside of marriage by women," and under Dale that
reformulation would receive deference.
68. Dale, 530 U.S. at 655.
69. Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Perils of Moderation: The Case of the Boy Scouts,
74 S. CAL. L. REV. 119, 139-40 (2000).
70. Id. at 140.
71. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (rejecting claim based upon the
Commerce Clause that the 1964 Civil Rights Act could not be applied to Ollie's Barbeque).
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providing them with service at his restaurant.72 Thus, the right of
expressive association might threaten the enforcement of anti-
discrimination laws where purely commercial entities owned by people
with strong convictions claim to be entitled to the right's protection.
The Court's language in Dale-"must engage in some form of
expression"-tends to support a broad application of the right of
expressive association. The very act of discriminating, one might say,
is expression sufficient to bring the right of expressive association into
play.73  Alternatively, one might analogize the association forced by
anti-discrimination laws to coerced expression in the free speech
context. Perhaps, at best, it can be said that a line must be drawn
somewhere, noting only that size, the amount of expression relative to
the amount of commercial activity, and the degree to which an entity is
under the personal supervision of individuals who espouse particular
views will affect the line-drawing exercise. That is, the larger and more
fully commercial the enterprise, the less likely a successful right of
expressive association claim will be. 74
If large commercial enterprises pose one problem for efforts to define
the coverage of the right of expressive association, extremely small
enterprises pose another. Here, the model is the individual landlord
renting a room, or the half of a duplex in which he or she does not
reside, to tenants. The landlord may have religious objections to
cohabitation by non-married people, and want to refuse to rent the room
to a cohabiting couple. Enforcing an ordinance prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of marital status might indeed force
72. Ian Ayres, Alternative Grounds: Epstein's Discrimination Analysis in Other Market
Settings, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 67, 72 (1994) (citing Maddox's obituary to support the assertion
that "Lester Maddox gained national publicity shortly after passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
when he distributed ax handles to supporters in order to prevent blacks from patronizing his
Atlanta restaurant, the Pickrick").
73. Analogous arguments have been made in connection with claims that these expressions
are protected by the Free Speech clause directly. The literature is extensive. See, e.g., Deborah
Epstein, Can a "Dumb Ass Woman" Achieve Equality in the Workplace? Running the Gauntlet of
Hostile Environment Harassing Speech, 84 GEO. L.J. 399 (1996); Eugene Volokh, Comment,
Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791 (1992). I suspect that
supplementing the free speech arguments with an argument drawing upon the right of expressive
association will not change anyone's position on where the line should be drawn.
74. Bernstein, supra note 67, at 215-17. Bernstein relies on the fact that Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor voted with the majority in Dale and previously stated that the right of expressive
association extended only to associations that were primarily expressive to support his conclusion
that the right extends only to non-profit associations. Id. at 127. According to Bernstein, "[iut is
difficult to see how a for-profit entity would successfully argue that it exists primarily for
expressive purposes." Id. I note that this limitation seems in some tension with Dale's
apparently broader formulation.
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something reasonably called association on the unwilling landlord. Yet,
as Herbert Wechsler notoriously pointed out, the government forces
association on unwilling people all the time.75 The landlord's case may
differ from the general case of forced association for two reasons. First,
the setting seems more intimate, more directly tied to the landlord's
definition of his or her own identity, than in the general case of forced
association through anti-discrimination laws. 76  The landlord, that is,
may be able to assert a right to intimate association as the basis for
finding unconstitutional this particular type of "forced association."
Second, society may be more willing to accept as sincere those claims
based on the idea that association in relatively small-scale interactions
would send a message to the world inconsistent with the messages the
objector wishes to send. In this way the claim of forced association
takes on a specific expressive component. My intuition is that a
landlord, physically present near the leased premises, should be able to
claim protection under the right of expressive association.
C. Identifying Impermissibly Coerced Messages
The second problem with the right of expressive association that
deserves attention, is the Court's conclusion in Dale that the right is
violated when a statute has the effect of requiring an entity covered by
the right of expressive association to "send a message to the world"
inconsistent with the entity's own beliefs. 77 In Dale, enforcing the
state's anti-discrimination laws would not require the Boy Scouts
actually to send a literal message. Rather, as the Court put it, "Dale's
presence" sends the message. 78 Action, not words, sends the message
that conflicts with the Boy Scouts' own message.
A wide range of actions might send a message that violates the right
of expressive association. Consider the idea of scandal as it occurs in
75. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1959) (stating "the freedom of association is denied by segregation" and arguing that the same
freedom is denied by desegregation as well).
76. The jurisdictional limitation in federal anti-discrimination law, which extends the scope of
coverage only to non-intimate settings, seems to confirm my sense that society recognizes a
difference between intimate and non-intimate settings. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(b) (1994) (defining an employer as one "who has fifteen or more employees"); Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (1994) (exempting from the Fair Housing Act of 1968
multifamily dwellings of fewer than four units, if the owner resides in one of them). Of course,
this jurisdictional limitation is simply statutory, and I am claiming that the Constitution requires
some sort of jurisdictional limitation, at least when claims against forced association rest on
concerns about expression, whether religious or political.
77. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
78. Id. at 653.
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Roman Catholic moral teaching. According to one definition, an action
may constitute a scandal when it leads someone else to sin or to think
less of the teaching of the Church. 79 The idea of scandal is simple: non-
Catholics will think less of the church when they observe a Catholic, or
a church-related institution, engaged in actions that appear inconsistent
with what the observers believe to be Catholic doctrine, because the
observers will think the actions hypocritical. An example of the
problem would be whether a doctor who performs elective sterilizations
in her private medical practice should be given hospital privileges at a
hospital operated under the control of the Catholic Church.
The concept of scandal plays a role in the complex body of Catholic
moral teaching dealing with cooperation with evil. In that teaching, the
possibility of scandal is one element that should be taken into account
when a Catholic, or a church-related institution, contemplates a
particular action; it is rarely dispositive. That, however, is simply a
characteristic of the specific teachings of the Catholic Church.
Individuals or entities protected by the right of expressive association
certainly could take a broader view of scandal than does Catholic moral
teaching.80 The previously discussed landlord, for example, might have
personal views according to which it would be scandalous for people to
know that he or she had rented the duplex to a cohabiting couple. A
person or entity covered by the right of expressive association might
claim that complying with some government directive would be
scandalous in the relevant sense; it would lead others to think less of
that person or entity's commitment to its religious beliefs. Notably, the
point of scandal is that scandalous acts interfere with the message the
person or entity is attempting to communicate. Additionally, Dale
holds that the courts must defer to the claimant's own characterization
of its religious beliefs, which, I would think, would have to include
beliefs about what constitutes a scandal. Through this route, a person or
entity might be able to establish the claim that complying with
government regulations would violate the right of expressive
association. 81
79. BENEDICT M. ASHLEY, O.P., & KEVIN D. O'ROURKE, O.P., HEALTH CARE ETHICS: A
THEOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 195 (4th ed. 1997).
80. See Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (holding that the Free
Exercise Clause protects a person with sincere religious beliefs even though the person was not a
member of an established religious sect or church).
81. The Court's opinion in Dale suggests that courts might review the claim of scandal to see
if the claimant sincerely believed that scandal would result from compliance. See Dale, 530 U.S.
at 646-47. Historically the courts have been reluctant to find that a belief assertedly held by a
claimant is held insincerely, and I suspect that this would be true in the context of the right of
expressive association as well.
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D. Conclusion
In Dale, for the first time, the Supreme Court found that a state law
violated the right of expressive association. From the majority's point
of view, the case may have been a particularly strong one for enforcing
that right. However, it is important to note that four justices dissented.
Therefore, one should be cautious in developing robust and far-reaching
doctrines on the basis of Dale and its analytic structure. Perhaps,
though, one should take the Court at its word. Dale, as doctrine, could
support the development of constitutional prohibitions on a substantial
range of state regulatory efforts that might not fall directly under the
protection of the Free Speech Clause. If so, the independent
contribution of the Free Exercise Clause to religious liberty would be
further reduced.
IV. THE RESIDUAL EFFECTS OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
The Free Exercise Clause has some residual content after Smith, the
peyote case. First, state laws are immunized from free exercise scrutiny
only if they are neutral laws of general. applicability. As the Santerfa
case shows, laws that single out religious practices for adverse treatment
are subject to careful constitutional examination. 82 Yet, nearly every
such law would be subject to the same degree of careful examination
under the Free Speech Clause. As we have seen, a great deal of
religious activity is either speech in its pristine form or can fairly be
characterized as expressive conduct. When the state singles out such
speech or expressive conduct for regulation, it engages in viewpoint
discrimination. After all, singling out some activity for differential
treatment is just another way for the government to discriminate against
that activity. The residual Free Exercise Clause might protect against
laws singling out religious activities that could not fairly be
characterized as expressive conduct, but I am confident that the number
of instances in which such protection is needed is quite small. The
activities that irritate people so much that they press their
representatives to regulate only these activities and not other similar
activities are quite likely to be religious speech or expressive conduct.
The more interesting residual component of the Free Exercise Clause
is the protection it affords to what have come to be called hybrid claims,
that is, claims in which a free exercise claim that would be insufficient
standing alone to trigger close examination of the challenged
government conduct is joined with some other constitutionally rooted
82. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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claim that would be insufficient standing alone to do so as well.83 It has
never been made clear how we should understand the protection given
hybrid claims. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
offered an extensive, and to my mind exceedingly generous, analysis of
the hybrid-claim issue in a now-vacated decision. 84 The case involved a
challenge to the enforcement of a local ordinance barring discrimination
by landlords against potential tenants on the basis of their non-marital
status. The landlord had religious objections to non-marital
cohabitation, and refused to rent an apartment to an unmarried couple
who were, in the landlord's view, more than mere roommates.
According to the panel, close examination was justified when the
claimant presented non-frivolous arguments that the activity sought to
be regulated was protected by some constitutional provision other than
the Free Exercise Clause, joined with a substantial argument that the
regulation had a disparate adverse impact on those with particular
religious beliefs.85 This formulation would approximate the restoration
of the Free Exercise Clause to its pre-Smith scope, in light of the ready
availability of non-frivolous arguments supporting an enormous range
of asserted constitutional claims. More important, it seems quite likely
that, under today's law, the landlord has not just a non-frivolous
constitutional claim, but a good one, that insisting that he refrain from
discriminating against unmarried tenants would violate his right of
expressive association. 86
The Free Exercise Clause might have a final and perhaps unexpected
residual effect. Consider permissible accommodations of religion, that
83. I do not discuss the other qualification the Smith Court placed on its formulation of free
exercise doctrine, that one could still make valid free exercise claims in contexts where the state
already had in place a mechanism for making individualized determinations relevant to the free
exercise claims. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 880-81
(1990). 1 know of no decisions relying on this qualification, which in any event seems quite
unjustified on the facts of Smith and, as far as I can tell, every other free exercise case the Court
has decided. As the Court analyzed Smith, the question for decision was whether the state had to
adjust its criminal laws against drug use to accommodate those who used peyote in religious
ceremonies. Id. at 874. The criminal enforcement setting, however, is full of opportunities for
individualized determinations, both informal, as prosecutors make decisions about which cases to
pursue, and formal, when juries could be asked whether a particular defendant presented a claim
for accommodation that ought to be honored. If the qualification would be applicable to Smith
itself, it is hard to see what content it could have. See also McConnell, supra note 3, at 3 (noting
that "few statutes are generally applicable across the board, without exceptions and without
consideration of individual cases").
84. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1999), withdrawn for
reh'g, 192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999), vacated en banc, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).
85. Id.
86. See supra Part III.B (discussing the scope of the right of expressive association).
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is, statutes in which the legislature itself adjusts the scope of its
regulatory programs by exempting some potential subjects of regulation
by explicit reference to some religious feature of their activity or
composition. These accommodations have been challenged under the
Establishment Clause. 87  What justifications for such accommodations
might a legislature offer, in the absence of a Free Exercise Clause?
Without the Free Exercise Clause, the legislature's action would have to
be justified by some aspect of its general police power. That is, its
explanation for its refusal to extend regulatory power to the full scope
suggested by the statutory definitions absent the accommodation would
have to refer to its general authority to legislate in the public interest,
including the public interest in treating religious believers decently. 88
But the general police power cannot be a sufficient justification against
an otherwise cogent anti-establishment challenge, because every law is
justified by the general police power. To allow the police power to
justify what would otherwise be violations of the anti-establishment
principle would be to deprive that principle of any content. The Free
Exercise Clause, however, might operate as a narrow justification for
legislative accommodations of religion. 89
The residual Free Exercise Clause, then, may still be inextricably
linked to the Establishment Clause, not because, as in the conventional
view, both clauses protect religious liberty, but because the Free
Exercise Clause is necessary to defeat Establishment Clause challenges
to a certain class of statutes.
87. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327 (1987) (holding that the application of a statutory exemption to a religious
organization's secular activities did not violate the Establishment Clause; noting that sufficient
room exists under the Clause for benevolent neutrality allowing religious exercise to exist without
sponsorship and without interference).
88. In a non-religious context, a government may adjust the scope of its programs without
serious constitutional limitation. A program regulating agricultural production, for example, may
exempt peanut farmers. The exemption would be permissible if rationally supported by some
police power rationale. Calling the exemption an accommodation to peanut farmers brings out
the parallel to religious accommodations, and demonstrates the large extent to which police
power rationales can support accommodations.
89. Accommodating religious belief might be more problematic than other exemptions from
regulatory programs. Religious accommodations discriminate in favor of a certain type of belief,
and therefore against other types. Ordinarily such discrimination would have to survive a high
degree of review. See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (holding that the
city ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause by making an impermissible distinction in
permitting peaceful labor picketing and banning other peaceful picketing). The Free Exercise
Clause might lower the standard for justifying religiously based accommodations in the face of an
objection based on the equality component of the free speech doctrine. (I admit to being a bit
uncomfortable with this assertion, because I have a sense that it attempts to make the Free
Exercise Clause do too much work across disparate constitutional provisions.)
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V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's peyote decision has been widely decried as
substantially reducing the constitutional protection afforded religious
belief and practice. 90 Such criticisms overlook the possibility that
practices previously protected by the Free Exercise Clause can still be
protected under other constitutional doctrines. 91  The free speech
doctrine and the newly defined right of expressive association go a long
way to providing an adequate substitute for the Free Exercise Clause.
What may be lost, however, is a sense that religious discourse is
somehow importantly different from non-religious discourse about
politics, morals, and the rest of human activity. Whether we ought to
regret the diminution of that sense in constitutional law is, of course,
another question.
90. See Battaglia, supra note 53, at 376; Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise,
1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise and the Smith Decision, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990).
91. I should note as well that the actual protection distinctively afforded by the Free Exercise
Clause was always smaller than the Clause's most vigorous proponents asserted. For a
discussion, see Mark Tul net, The Rhetoric of Free Exercise Discourse, 1993 BYU L. REV. 117.
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